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Abstract 
There has always been a localist element to British politics.  But recently, a particular version 
of localism has been moved to the foreground by the 2011 Localism Act.  This paper 
identifies various uses and meanings of localism, maps their geographical assumptions and 
effects, and critiques their politics.  It does this using the localism of the United Kingdom’s 
Coalition Government as a case study of localism in practice.  The rationalities, mentalities, 
programmes, and technologies of this localism are established from Ministerial speeches and 
press releases, along with Parliamentary Acts, Bills, White Papers, Green Papers, and 
Statements – all published between May 2010 when the Coalition Government was formed, 
and November 2011 when the Localism Act became law.  We argue that localism may be 
conceptualised as spatial liberalism, is never straightforwardly local, and can be anti-political. 
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1. Uses and Meanings of Localism 
The potential of local politics has long been a matter of controversy in political geography.  
From one perspective, the relentlessly parochial nature of the local is said to invite 
fragmentation, not only limiting the ambitions of those engaged in politics at that level, but 
also encouraging division and competition between those who should be united in the face of 
global challenges.  From another, local action is understood to make it possible to build 
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movements that can both win particular concessions and, in some circumstances at least, go 
beyond them – whether by generalising around a shared agenda or building alliances with 
others.  In the academic literature, the potential and limitations of local politics have often 
been considered from the point of view of those seeking to develop a progressive politics.  In 
this paper we have rather a different starting point, focusing on a particular example of local 
politics in practice; or, more accurately, a particular way of thinking about local politics that 
its proponents hope to see translated into practice – namely, the localism espoused by the 
United Kingdom’s (UK) Coalition government (although it is one of the constitutional ironies 
of British politics that the UK government’s localism policy only applies to England).  If 
developing a progressive politics of place or locality is a difficult challenge, here we reflect 
on some of the challenges and tensions being faced by those seeking to develop localism as a 
more straightforward conservative force. 
A set of overlapping and contradictory political meanings clusters around the notion 
of localism.  It is possible to identify at least four of these in contemporary political and 
academic discourses.  At its simplest, a commitment to localism describes a positive 
disposition towards the decentralisation of political power.  In this regard, two traditions are 
apparent that sit uneasily alongside each other but are often mobilised together as if they were 
complementary or indeed identical.  The first is the classical-liberal tradition harking back to 
John Stuart Mill, comparing local or neighbourhood government to national or regional 
government and finding it to be less bureaucratic, more efficient, more responsive to local 
needs, and more democratic – in part because it is assumed that people can know local 
councillors personally or relatively easily become local councillors themselves (see Corry 
and Stoker, 2002; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008).  The second, communitarian, localism, 
which in some respects harks back to Burke but in other versions has a more anarchist 
pedigree echoing Kropotkin, views local community or civil society as some kind of 
mediating institutional layer through which responsible action, right living, and good welfare 
outcomes may be achieved (see Blond, 2010; Hall, 1988; Smith, 2000). 
Localism is also used, however, to describe the actually existing decentralisation of 
political responsibility, which may or may not follow from the positive disposition identified 
in the previous paragraph.  This may be decentralisation to elected local government – the 
meaning of localism for the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 1985), the New Local 
Government Network (Corry and Stoker, 2002), and the Local Government Association of 
England and Wales (LGA, 2006).  Or it may be decentralisation to numerous bodies thought 
to be local in some way or other e.g. partnerships, community groups, neighbourhood 
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organisations, private-sector firms, civil society organisations, public-service professionals, 
or individuals.  This is less a vision of localism as a way of organising social and political life 
and more an expression of institutional reality, consistent with the way in which Duncan and 
Goodwin (1988) explain the local state as a necessary consequence of uneven development, 
rather than the result of any political or ideological commitment (while nevertheless 
suggesting that it is this that generates the possibility of pluralism as a necessary feature of 
local politics). 
Aspects of these first two phenomena, when expressed in recent moves to decentralise 
political power in the UK, have been termed ‘the new localism’ (Corry and Stoker, 2002).  
But the term has also been used to capture rather different ways of thinking (see Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002; Clarke, 2009).  These include our third and fourth expressions of localism.  
The third starts from an assumption that some groups and interests are locally dependent, in 
the short term at least, which may generate a politics of locality that brings together locally 
dependent firms, politicians, and workers in growth coalitions of one sort or another (Cox and 
Mair, 1988, 1991; Logan and Molotch, 2007).  Connected to this, but going further, the 
fourth conceptualisation of localism raises the possibility of the strategic production and use 
of localities as spaces of engagement oriented to a variety of ends (Cox, 1998).  At various 
times and in different places, this has been associated with: attempts to regulate the capitalist 
economy by, for example, promotion of local economic development policies or even local 
socialism (see Boddy and Fudge, 1984; Clarke and Cochrane, 1990; Goodwin and Painter, 
1996; Goodwin et al, 1993; Mackintosh and Wainwright, 1987; Stoker and Mossberger, 
1995; Wainwright, 2003); the reframing of welfare provision by, for example, 
decentralisation of functions to micro-agencies and private-sector firms, or through 
democratisation and participation (see Burns et al, 1994; King and Stoker, 1996; John, 2001; 
Wainwright and Little, 2009); and government of the population by, for example, promotion 
of self-regulating and enterprising communities (see Amin, 2005; Cochrane and Newman, 
2009; Rose, 1996). 
When localism is used in political discourse, its meaning is often purposefully vague 
and imprecise. It brings geographical understandings about scale and place together with sets 
of political understandings about decentralisation, participation, and community, and 
managerialist understandings about efficiency and forms of market delivery – moving easily 
between each of them, even when their fit is uncertain. It is often intentionally associated, 
confused, or conflated with local government, local democracy, community, decentralisation, 
governance, privatisation, civil society etc. for political effect.  This is part of what makes 
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localism such an attractive concept capable of being mobilised by all three of the UK’s main 
Westminster-oriented political parties. 
Until recently, the UK’s governmental system was often described as a unitary one in 
contrast to federal systems like those of the USA or Germany (Rose, 1982).  Formally, even 
devolution to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland may not have changed this position – 
since devolution remains a gift of Westminster – but in practice, coupled with the multi-level 
governance associated with the European Union, it is now hard for even the most resistant of 
constitutionalists to view matters through a unitary prism.  It would in any case be mistaken 
to maintain a vision of the UK as a state in which power had ever been somehow 
concentrated in Whitehall to be delegated from the centre.  Rhodes’ systematic and 
thoughtful work on central-local relations and sub-national government of the 1980s confirms 
the negotiated complexities of the relationship (Rhodes, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1988).  And, of 
course, there has been a long tradition of local government initiative, from the ‘gas and water 
socialism’ and ‘urban squirearchy’ of the late nineteenth century (Fraser, 1976; Garrard, 
1995; Hunt, 2004), to the Poplarism and Little Moscows of the 1920s and 1930s (Branson, 
1979; Macintyre, 1980), to the municipal Labourism of Herbert Morrison’s London County 
Council and the pragmatic Toryism of the shires (Bulpitt, 1983; Donoghue and Jones, 2001), 
to the taken for granted municipal empires of the post-1945 period, nominally with delegated 
responsibility for education, council housing, and social service, but in practice defining the 
local welfare state (Cockburn, 1977; Dearlove, 1979; Keith-Lucas and Richards, 1978).  And 
alongside this long tradition of municipal activism of one sort or another has run an equally 
significant discourse – particularly within the Conservative Party – finding an expression in a 
language of ‘local patriotism’ (Cragoe, 2007), in which the local has been explicitly 
counterposed to fears of socialist centralism.  For some rooted in this tradition, the Thatcher 
period of the 1980s was a regrettable lapse into centralism, even if it was justified in neo-
liberal terms (e.g. Jenkins, 2004). 
In that sense, localism has been a continuing and inescapable feature of British 
politics.  But recently it has been moved to the foreground in a distinctive way by the 
Coalition Government’s Localism Act 2011 (see below) – in the context of a rather different 
set of political imaginings, as well as the wider context of a devolved UK, which means that 
the Act itself is only relevant to England.
1
  In their different ways, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland are all developing quite distinctive institutional lives of their own, while the 
sub-national spatial scales of English politics remain uncertain, as the regional government 
machinery of the 1997-2010 Labour government is dismantled, to be replaced by more 
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diffuse institutional structures such as Local Enterprise Partnerships and City Deals, and 
localism replaces regionalism as a discourse of spatial governance (for a case study of the rise 
and fall of one government region as a political territory, see Cochrane, 2012).  Some have 
even begun to argue that forms of localism might provide an alternative vision for the 
European Union, in place of more complex patterns of multi-level governance and the 
principle of delivering an ‘ever closer union’ (e.g. Browne and Persson, 2011). 
In this paper, we make no claims to define localism for use as a social science 
concept.  Instead, we aim to explore the way in which it has been mobilised in the language 
of the UK’s Coalition Government (as it relates to other localisms e.g. the localism of New 
Labour), taking it seriously as an active geographical political re-imaging of the spaces and 
places of advanced liberalism.  The rationalities, mentalities, programmes, and technologies 
of this localism were established from relevant Ministerial speeches and press releases, along 
with Parliamentary Acts, Bills, White Papers, Green Papers, and Statements – all published 
between May 2010 when the Coalition Government was formed, and November 2011 when 
the Localism Bill received royal assent and became law (as the Localism Act). 
The next section introduces the localism of the Coalition Government.  After that, we 
consider: the relationship between localism, liberalism, and decentralisation, conceptualising 
localism as spatial liberalism (section three); the geographies of localism, which are not 
straightforwardly local (section four); and the politics of localism, including various ways in 
which localism can be anti-political (section five). 
 
2. The Localism of the UK’s Coalition Government 
The UK’s first Coalition Government for more than 60 years was formed in May 2010 
between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats after no party received enough votes in the 
2010 General Election to govern alone.  To date, one of the central themes of this Coalition 
Government has been localism.  This is reflected in its Programme for Government (HM 
Government, 2010a: 11): 
The Government believes that it is time for a fundamental shift of power from 
Westminster to people.  We will promote decentralisation and democratic 
engagement, and we will end the era of top-down government by giving new powers 
to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods, and individuals. 
It can also be seen in the Localism Bill, given royal assent and made law in November 2011 
(HM Government, 2010b: 2): 
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The best contribution that central government can make is to devolve power, money, 
and knowledge to those best placed to find the best solutions to local needs: elected 
local representatives, frontline public service professionals, social enterprises, 
charities, co-ops, community groups, neighbourhoods, and individuals. 
In both documents, it is argued that power in England has become too concentrated in 
Westminster and needs dispersing to local councils, but also to a variety of other actors 
presumed to be local in some way or other (communities, public service professionals, social 
enterprises, individuals, and so on).  Prime Minister David Cameron is quoted in the 
Executive Summary of the Localism Bill on the case for decentralisation (HM Government, 
2010b: 4): 
There’s the efficiency argument – that in huge hierarchies, money gets spent on 
bureaucracy instead of the frontline.  There is the fairness argument – that centralised 
national blueprints don’t allow for local solutions to major social problems.  And 
there is the political argument – that centralisation creates a distance in our democracy 
between the government and the governed. 
The case begins with identification of three deficits: an efficiency deficit; a fairness deficit; 
and a democratic deficit.  It proceeds by attributing these deficits to centralisation, which is 
associated with hierarchy and bureaucracy.  Decentralisation is proposed as the solution.  
Elsewhere, decentralisation has been positioned by Greg Clark, Minister for Decentralisation 
and Cities, as one method for achieving all three strands of the Big Society: public sector 
reform; community empowerment; and philanthropic action (Clark, 2010). 
How are these rationalities or mentalities of government being translated into policy, 
legislation, programmes, and technologies?  Figures 1 and 2 list the relevant legislative and 
policy documents and announcements published between May 2010 and November 2011.  It 
would seem that localism for the Coalition Government involves at least three parts.  First, 
there are moves to free local government from central and regional control.  These include: 
abolishing Comprehensive Area Assessments, Local Area Agreements, Regional Strategies, 
Government Offices in the Regions, the Standards Board regime, the Audit Commission, the 
National Indicator Set, and central house building targets; reducing ring-fencing of revenue 
grants, the number of statutory duties on local government, and the amount of planning law 
and guidance; allowing Local Authorities to change bylaws without consulting Whitehall, to 
choose their own structure of governance (Mayor, Leader and Cabinet, or Committee), and to 
retain and borrow against business rates generated locally; and introducing a General Power 
of Competence for Local Authorities, allowing them to act in the interest of their 
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communities and in their own financial interest, to raise money by charging and trading, and 
to provide indemnities and guarantees. 
The second part is to make local government more directly accountable to local 
people.  We see this in new codes on publicity (limiting the public relations and marketing 
content of Local Authority newspapers) and data transparency (requiring Local Authorities to 
publish information on contracts, tenders, performance, salaries, and assets).  There are also 
plans for elected mayors in England’s twelve largest cities outside London,2 and to allow 
residents to instigate referendums on local issues. 
The final part involves devolving power beyond local government to that variety of 
actors presumed to be local (communities, civil society organisations, individuals, and so on).  
Here, the Academies Act allowed more schools to become Academies.  Free Schools have 
been introduced.  The Local Authority Two-Tier Code has been revoked, freeing private 
sector firms with Local Authority contracts to set their own terms and conditions for 
transferred staff and their equivalents.  Local Enterprise Partnerships have been established 
with chairs from the business sector and direct access to a Regional Growth Fund as well as 
responsibility for transport planning and expenditure.  All of these items – some of which 
may appear unrelated in significant respects – have been woven into the localism narrative of 
the Coalition Government.  They have been joined by: a community Right to Challenge (to 
challenge the delivery of services by Local Authorities); a community Right to Buy (to buy 
community assets from Local Authorities); a community Right to Provide (to provide 
services in place of Local Authorities); a Civil Society Red Tape Task Force to assist civil 
society organisations in their dealings with government; a Big Society Bank to provide social 
enterprises with access to finance; Community Budgets and Personal Budgets to enable local 
partnerships and individuals to become commissioners of public services; and 
Neighbourhood Planning. 
In a speech to the Local Government Association Annual Conference, Eric Pickles, 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, listed many of these actions and 
plans before concluding (Pickles, 2011a: no p. n.): “This is a decisive, fundamental, and 
irreversible change in England’s political geography, one of the world’s most centralised 
states.  We are taking power away from Whitehall and putting it back in the hands of 
councillors and councils”.  Such claims about England’s political geography demand 
consideration from geographers and related scholars, even if some appear questionable at 
best; particularly the claim that power is being put back in the hands of local government. 
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This becomes especially clear when local government funding is added to the mix.  In 
the Comprehensive Spending Review of October 2010, covering the period from 2010 to 
2015, revenue funding to local government was cut by 26% in real terms (excluding schools, 
fire, and police).  Capital funding to local government was cut by 45%.  The schools budget 
was increased by 0.1% but capital funding for schools was cut by 60%.  Other cuts included 
50% to social housing, 34% to flood defence and coastal erosion, and 8% to local roads.  
Additional money for social care was made available: £530m in 2011-12, rising to £1bn in 
2013-14.  But the Local Government Association estimates rising costs for social care far 
beyond these amounts because of demographic pressures (LGA, 2010a).  It also estimates 
rising costs in the areas of flood defence, child protection, and waste management (LGA, 
2010b). 
There is more.  The Budget of June 2010 asked Local Authorities to freeze Council 
Tax
3
 in return for a share of £650m – equivalent to a below-inflation rise of 2.5%.  This was 
done under threat of Council Tax capping.  It has been done again for 2012-13.  Meanwhile, 
Council Tax revaluation has been postponed until after the next General Election.  And small 
Business Rate Relief was doubled in 2010-11 and again for 2011-12.  So local government is 
under severe financial pressure.  Margaret Eaton, Chair of the Local Government Association 
in October 2010, responded to the Comprehensive Spending Review by saying (Eaton, 2010: 
no p. n.): “These cuts will hurt.  We know this means there will be fewer libraries, more pot 
holes going unrepaired, parks shutting earlier, and youth clubs closing.  [...] Our estimate is 
up to 100,000 jobs in Local Authorities will go”.  We might add that cuts will hurt some 
Local Authorities more than others.  In the Local Government Finance Settlement for 2011-
12, the spending power of Local Authorities was cut by an average of 4.4%.  But some Local 
Authorities received cuts of 1% or less, while others received cuts of 8.9%.  The former 
included some of the least deprived localities in England (Dorset, Windsor, Maidenhead, 
Poole, West Sussex, Wokingham, Richmond, and Buckinghamshire).  The latter included 
some of the most deprived (Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Newham, Manchester, Rochdale, 
Knowlsey, Liverpool, St Helens, Doncaster, and South Tyneside).  These deprived localities 
had benefited under New Labour from area-based grants such as the Working 
Neighbourhoods Fund. 
So localism is a central theme for the Coalition Government.  It is understood to mean 
decentralisation and is presented as a solution to perceived deficits of efficiency, fairness, and 
democracy in the British state.  Already, there have been legislative moves towards freeing 
local government from central and regional control, making local government more 
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accountable to local people, and devolving power beyond local government to a variety of 
other bodies thought to be local.  Complicating this picture, there have been moves to reduce 
local government funding.  These latter developments may support the devolution of power 
beyond local government, but they compromise any potential autonomy for local 
government.  It is to localism’s complicated relationship with decentralisation and 
centralisation that we now turn. 
 
3. Localism as Spatial Liberalism 
The Coalition Government associates localism with decentralisation.  Ministers speak of 
freeing local government and other local bodies from regional and central control.  But 
decentralisation is not all they speak of when the topic is localism (see Figures 1 and 2).  
Ministers are consulting on whether to use ‘proportions’ (of public services that must be 
delivered by civil society organisations) in pursuit of devolution beyond local government.  
Eric Pickles has promised to cap Council Tax in cases of “excessive increase”.  In a speech to 
the National Council for Voluntary Organisations Annual Conference, Pickles threatened to 
force Local Authorities to protect local voluntary and community groups from 
“disproportionate” cuts (Pickles, 2011b: no p. n.): 
I think the way that a council works with the voluntary sector through this testing time 
is a key test of whether they are really ready for independent, responsible leadership.  
I’ve made it very clear they must resist any temptation to pull up the drawbridge and 
pass on disproportionate cuts.  [...] Let me be crystal clear: we have reasonable 
expectations of how Local Authorities will conduct themselves.  [...] So if councils 
are being high-handed, I’ll consider giving our reasonable expectations statutory 
force.  Because in order to make a success of localism – in order to enable our towns 
and neighbourhoods to thrive – I want to make sure that voluntary and charitable 
groups have got the confidence, the clout, and the power to make their mark. 
Here, decentralisation appears conditional on local government behaving “responsibly” and 
meeting the expectations of Ministers regarding conduct.  It is suggested, paradoxically, that 
statutory force may be used against local government to ensure that localism becomes a 
success. 
How should we interpret this complicated picture?  We could take the above 
paragraph as evidence that localism for the Coalition Government is ‘merely rhetorical’ – 
ideological cover for something else (in this case, localism’s apparent opposite: 
centralisation).  But that would be to deny substantial evidence to the contrary (see Section 
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2).  Instead, we could learn something from nuanced accounts of liberalism influenced by 
Foucault’s writings on governmentality (e.g. Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999).  Positioning liberalism 
in the large space between absolute freedom and total regulation, these accounts suggest that 
critiques of localism should not aim to measure it against some ideal of absolute 
decentralisation.  Just as liberalism in practice does not equate straightforwardly to complete 
liberalisation, so localism in practice will not equate straightforwardly to complete 
decentralisation or localisation. 
For Dean, Rose, and others (e.g. Hindess, 2004), liberalism describes a normative 
critique of excessive government; a response to the dangers of governing too much.  But the 
freedoms of liberalism are conditional.  Freed citizens must behave rationally and responsibly 
because, just as there are dangers of governing too much (e.g. dependency), so there are 
dangers of governing too little (e.g. disorder).  Liberalism in practice, then, involves not the 
retreat of regulation but the shift of regulation from domination towards the production of 
rational and responsible citizens through technologies of ‘government at a distance’.  Finally, 
where such liberal technologies fail, in the last instance, liberalism in practice involves 
regulation by sovereign, illiberal solutions (e.g. confinement). 
Localism can usefully be thought of as spatial liberalism: government of localities, as 
opposed to persons, from the position that localities should be assembled and freed to act in 
the interests of general security and wellbeing, but only so long as they can be made up as 
rational and responsible actors.  Such government involves: deciding on what counts as 
rational and responsible local action; enabling those actions through decentralisation where 
possible; encouraging those actions through liberal technologies of government where 
appropriate; and enforcing those actions through centralisation where absolutely necessary. 
In some respects there are strong continuities between New Labour’s emphasis on 
community and neighbourhood, and the Coalition’s approach to localism.  For New Labour, 
drawing in community or neighbourhood interests was understood as a means of encouraging 
different forms of behaviour by involving local actors in making decisions about the places in 
which they lived and the ways in which they lived in them.  The various New Deal for 
Communities programmes linked community representatives into renewal schemes where 
communities were offered influence over those schemes, within the parameters set by 
government and commercial partners, so long as they also accepted responsibility for 
maintaining the viability of their own communities (Cochrane, 2004, 2007).  However, the 
localism of the Coalition Government both builds on New Labour’s approaches – taking the 
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logics further in significant ways – but also reframes them by moving away from any 
remaining expectations about the maintenance of national standards. 
For New Labour, good conduct in localities described actions that were innovative, 
responsible, and entrepreneurial, but with a continued expectation of minimum national 
standards for public service delivery, policed through a range of agencies and agreements 
(see Foley and Martin, 2000; Hambleton, 2003; Lodge and Muir, 2010; Lowndes and 
Sullivan, 2008; Wallace, 2010; Wilson, 2001).  New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ promised to 
balance freedom and (spatial) equity, even if the promise was rarely delivered (Giddens, 
2000).  Such rational and responsible action was to be achieved by freeing from central 
control certain ‘high performing’ Local Authorities – so-called ‘earned autonomy’ – while 
governing the conduct of other councils through technologies of agency (Dean, 1999; e.g. 
best practice guidance), technologies of performance (ibid; e.g. targets and audit), and, where 
necessary, illiberal solutions e.g. inspection (see Martin, 2002; Pratchett and Leach, 2003, 
2004). 
For the Coalition Government, while rational and responsible action in localities is 
also expected to deliver innovative and entrepreneurial conduct, significantly greater 
emphasis is placed on action responding to needs perceived to be local in character.  We see 
this in comments on the so-called ‘postcode lottery’ in the Executive Summary of the 
Localism Bill (HM Government, 2010b: 5): 
Decentralisation will allow different communities to do things in different ways to 
meet their different needs.  This will certainly increase variety in service provision.  
But far from being random – as the word ‘lottery’ implies – such variation will reflect 
the conscious choices made by local people. 
Here, local variety in service provision is viewed as a good thing.  Rightly or wrongly, it is 
approached as an outcome not of local resource availability, nor of local provider 
competence, but of local priorities – to be expressed clearly through new mechanisms of 
democracy.  If New Labour borrowed the language of the new managerialism and positioned 
choice within that narrative, here the market analogy is still more powerful.  Perhaps in 
unconscious echoes of Tiebout (1956) – and, indeed, evocations of the ‘enabling’ authority 
endorsed under a previous Conservative government (Ridley, 1988) – what is implied is that 
local governments and maybe even neighbourhoods can make their own choices and, by 
implication, meet whatever might be the consequences of those choices. 
 The Coalition Government has little interest in pursuing national standards, except in 
a few policy areas perceived to be sensitive because voters might blame central government 
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for the deviations of local actors.  In these areas – including local taxation, local economic 
development, access to education and housing, and weekly bin collections – rational and 
responsible action is to be achieved by freeing all local actors from central control before 
governing their conduct through technologies of consumption (Rose, 1999): marketing, 
advertising, and sales that fuel aspiration and shape market choice.  Funding was made 
available to those Local Authorities who ‘chose’ to freeze Council Tax in 2011-12 and 2012-
13.  There are plans to allow Local Authorities to keep more of their business rates, 
rewarding Local Authorities that ‘choose’ to support, attract, and retain business.  
Communities that ‘choose’ to allow development in their neighbourhoods will receive the 
New Homes Bonus, matching Council Tax from new houses for six years, and more of the 
Community Infrastructure Levy, paid by developers in return for planning permission.  The 
New Homes Bonus will pay an extra 36% for ‘affordable’ homes, while the Pupil Premium 
will reward schools for recruiting children on free school meals.  Finally, £250m has been 
made available for Local Authorities that ‘choose’ to restore weekly bin collections. 
 In one respect, these choices are not really choices at all.  Local government funding 
has been cut quite enough that Local Authorities and other local actors may be desperate for 
the additional funding on offer through various bonus and compensation schemes.  Such 
provision of choice that is subsequently circumscribed by manipulating contexts will be 
familiar to those acquainted with recent libertarian/soft paternalist approaches to policy areas 
from personal debt to obesity and climate change (see Jones et al, 2010; Pykett et al, 2011).  
It will be interesting to see how long the Coalition Government persists with government 
through liberal technologies, even libertarian paternalist technologies, if local actors continue 
to act ‘irresponsibly’ – raising local taxes, resisting local development, rationing household 
waste collections, and so on.  For now, we can say that contemporary localism makes for a 
complicated picture and is best conceptualised as spatial liberalism.  Approaching localism in 
this way, we are encouraged to look beyond simple dismissals of localism as centralisation in 
disguise, towards different visions of rational and responsible local actors, and technologies 
for producing and regulating such actors.  What characterises the localism of the Coalition 
Government is a vision of good local conduct as that which, for the most part, responds in 
tailored ways to perceived local needs, and a project of encouraging such conduct limited to, 
again for the most part, soft-paternalist technologies of consumption.  We now turn to the 
geographies and politics of localism, because what counts as ‘local conduct’ and ‘local 
needs’, and whether ‘local actors’ and ‘local needs’ are indeed straightforwardly local, are 
questions demanding further consideration. 
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4. Geographies of Localism 
Localists tend to make naïve and romantic assumptions about the geographies of social 
structures.  They tend to overestimate the extent to which contemporary localities are 
coherent and autonomous – or the extent to which they can be made to be so.  This was true 
of New Labour’s attempt to govern through community (Amin, 2005; Wallace, 2010).  It is 
also true of the Coalition Government’s localism.  We see this in statements on the abolition 
of regional government, where regional government is referred to as “arbitrary government” 
(Pickles 2010: no p. n.), “a country divided into unnatural blocks” (Pickles and Cable, 2010: 
no p. n.), with localities positioned as the natural units of political geography.  Meanwhile, in 
the Executive Summary of the Localism Bill (HM Government, 2010b: 2), local actors are 
described as “those best placed to find the best solutions to local needs”. 
But localities are no by no means natural.  Local needs are rarely homogeneous.  And 
localities are rarely autonomous such that effective solutions to local needs are found just at 
the local scale.  If we did not already know this, it is confirmed from two decades of research 
on place, community, and the city (see Albrow, 1996; Amin, 2002; Amin and Thrift, 2002; 
Appadurai, 1996; Massey, 2005; Smith, 2001; Urry, 2000).  Localities are produced through 
distanciated relations.  They are nodes in networks, meeting places for mobilities, 
assemblages of parts from elsewhere (Allen and Cochrane, 2010).  They are dynamic, 
becoming, contingent.  They are plural, heterogeneous, contested.  This does not mean that 
community has been lost in the twenty-first century.  But it does mean that its geography and 
temporality have changed – from the relatively permanent neighbourhood to the relatively 
temporary personal network (Wellman, 1999). 
The localism of recent governments imagines natural localities in which needs can be 
agreed and met through local agency.  In doing so, it fails to recognise the translocal 
geography of many lives, which continually move across local borders – whether physically, 
virtually, or imaginatively.  It fails to recognise the radical plurality of many localities, where 
people meet with different genders and sexualities, from different social classes and ethnic 
backgrounds – often to disagree about local needs. And it fails to recognise the extent to 
which local needs, so far as they can be identified, often result from decisions made far 
beyond local borders – by investors, legislators, recruiters, migrants, polluters, and so on.  We 
return to this last point below in discussion of the politics of localism (see also Featherstone 
et al, 2012).  Before that, we develop the more general claim of this section: the geographies 
of localism are not straightforwardly local. 
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This observation has been made in passing by others.  Considering decentralisation 
beyond local government during the 1980s and early 1990s, Goodwin and Painter (1996) 
comment that moves from local government to local governance problematise the local in 
local government.  Partnerships open up ‘local’ governance to multiple actors (national and 
international governmental organisations, private-sector firms, community groups etc.) and 
their multiple agendas, whether local, national, international, or ‘sub-local’/neighbourhood 
(see also Cochrane, 2004).  Graham and Marvin (2001) consider the decentralisation of 
infrastructure networks from the 1960s onwards.  For a time, these networks were bundled by 
the state, with services standardised across localities, such that urban space was integrated in 
part by this very infrastructure.  Now, such networks are privatised.  This unbundled 
infrastructure fragments cities and splinters urbanism. 
So will the localism of the Coalition Government advance these processes, opening up 
local governance to multiple actors, agendas, and geographies, unbundling local services, 
fragmenting and splintering localities?  The actions and plans compiled in Figures 1 and 2 
suggest a complex institutional landscape comprised of: 
 Weakened Local Authorities.  These may be subject to local electorates.  But they 
may also be subject to national funding cuts.  And they may be subject to partners 
in service delivery.  For example, a tri-borough agreement has been signed between 
Westminster, Hammersmith and Fulham, and Kensington and Chelsea.  They will 
share senior management and integrate services. 
 Strengthened civil society organisations.  These may have new ‘rights’ of various 
kinds.  Some may be community organisations based in local neighbourhoods.  But 
some may be connected to larger organisations, whether charities, faith 
organisations, or investors.  For example, some Academies and Free Schools are 
links in ‘Academy chains’ (E-ACT, the Ark Trust, Oasis Community Learning, the 
Harris Foundation, the United Learning Trust) or embedded in faith-based 
organisations (the Church of England, the i-Foundation). 
 Strengthened private-sector firms.  These may be well-placed to compete for local 
government contracts in a context of fiscal tightening.  Again, some may be small 
and medium-sized enterprises based in local neighbourhoods.  But some may be 
connected to national and transnational parent companies, groups, investors, and so 
on. 
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 Various partnerships e.g. Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs).  These may cut 
across existing local government boundaries (e.g. Derby and Nottingham LEP).  
They may focus on specific sites via Local Enterprise Zones (e.g. Boots Campus, 
Nottingham). 
Little about this geography will be straightforwardly local.  And little about it will be 
radically new either.  The apparent plan is to complete moves begun in the 1980s and 
continued, sometimes hesitantly, over the last three decades: from local government to local 
governance; from Local Authorities to local partnerships; and from representative democracy 
to participatory democracy.  These moves have been associated with integration and 
coordination problems regarding service provision.  They have also been associated with 
accountability and participation problems regarding local democracy.  We now consider these 
problems and the politics of localism more broadly. 
 
5. (Anti-)Politics of Localism 
There never was a golden age of perfectly democratic local government.  There have always 
been one-party cities, run by paternalistic elites, where much of the power is held by 
unelected officers (Cochrane, 1993; Imrie and Raco, 1999).  But recent moves towards 
governance and partnerships – central elements of ‘the new localism’ identified by Brenner 
and Theodore (2002) – have been much criticised in democratic terms.  Such changes may 
have opened up local politics to more actors (Morgan, 2007), but responsibility has been 
obscured in governance arrangements, leading to accountability problems (Hambleton, 2003; 
Stewart and Stoker, 1995).  In partnerships, participation has been partial and unequal, 
favouring the educated, the wealthy, the ‘responsible’; excluding the inarticulate, the poor, 
the ‘extremists’ (Geddes, 2000; Raco, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2010; Walters, 2004).  
Participation has also had little effect on decisions because elites, often unelected, set the 
procedures and agendas, position themselves as experts, and position others as amateurs 
(Kearns, 1995; Lake, 1994; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004).  Alternatively, consensus is 
achieved between stakeholders.  This often glosses the key issues.  Little changes 
fundamentally, while political debate narrows (Geddes, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2009). 
We might add that even beyond these well-rehearsed criticisms, the politics of 
localism repays further critical attention (see also Featherstone et al, 2012).  As we have seen 
above, what happens locally is not shaped exclusively or even primarily by local decisions.  
Localities are produced by distanciated relations (Allen and Cochrane, 2010).  So an effective 
local politics in defence of local spaces of dependence must operate in multiple spaces of 
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engagement, including supra-local arenas (Cox, 1998).  The corollary here is that local 
decisions have effects elsewhere.  Just as the local is globally produced, so the global is 
locally produced (Massey, 2005).  Massey uses the example of London – a place in and 
through which globalisation is produced (see Massey 2005, 2007).  London is an agent in 
globalisation.  It is a seat of power, a command centre, a heartland and beneficiary of 
neoliberalism, a node in the production of an increasingly unequal world.  London has 
boomed in the UK at the expense of other regions, creating a brain drain from other regions.  
The same policies that have supported London have undermined other regions, from high 
interest rates to prevent inflationary consumer booms in London, to a focus on ‘the 
knowledge economy’.  London has also pulled in workers from Eastern Europe and the 
Global South.  It emits waste and carbon.  So there is potentially some purchase through local 
politics on wider global mechanisms.  And there is potentially some local responsibility for 
the global.  For Massey, a global sense of place demands a politics of connectivity or 
outwardlookingness.  This would be a politics questioning whether local residents should 
take all the decisions pertaining to a particular area, since the effects of such decisions would 
likely exceed the borders of that area.  It would be a local politics thinking beyond the local: 
“a politics of place beyond place” (ibid: 15). 
Neither of these complications – that localities are both produced by and productive 
of globalisation and the global – are recognised in the localism of the Coalition Government.  
Instead, the plan is for more of the same: local governance through partnerships.  There is, 
however, a concern to differentiate current localism from what has gone before.  Writing in 
The Guardian, Eric Pickles was concerned to do this regarding planning policy (Pickles, 
2011c: no p. n.): 
We want to take the power out of the hands of lawyers and bureaucrats and put it back 
in the hands of local people.  We are getting rid of John Prescott’s regional strategies 
and housing targets.  The local plans that councils draw up together with residents 
will hold greater sway than ever. 
He was also concerned to differentiate his own localism in a speech to the Queen’s Speech 
Forum (Pickles, 2011d: no p. n.): 
When people ask me about my priorities, I have three very clear priorities: localism, 
and we’ll weave that into everything we do from parks to finance to policy.  My 
second priority is localism, and my third is ... localism.  [...] Because we like the 
folks.  We don’t think we know better than they do.  And we trust them to know 
17 
 
what’s best for them.  So we are determined to wrest control from the bureaucrats, the 
quangos, and central government departments. 
If the localism of the Coalition Government differs from New Labour’s localism, it is 
because moves have been made to free local government from central and regional control, 
local government funding has been cut, and local variation in service provision is viewed as a 
problem only in certain policy areas, with economic incentives replacing targets and 
inspection as the preferred solution to this problem.  One way of presenting these differences 
is to emphasise the central role of unelected professionals during New Labour’s period of 
government (the “bureaucrats” and “quangos” mentioned by Pickles).  But two points are 
worth noting in this regard.  Firstly, the Coalition Government has established its own expert 
and, for the most part, unelected organisations operating at scales within and beyond the local 
government area (e.g. Academies, Free Schools, Local Enterprise Partnerships).  Secondly, 
while accusing New Labour of paternalism, the Coalition Government is effectively setting 
out to replace one form of anti-politics with another. 
Schedler (1997) conceptualises politics as activity defining societal problems and 
conflicts (i.e. delineating the realm of common affairs), elaborating binding decisions (i.e. 
managing these common affairs), and establishing its own rules.  He goes on to identify two 
forms of anti-political thought.  One works to dethrone, banish, and abolish politics so that 
politics becomes unemployed and the public sphere becomes vacated.  Here, collective 
problems might be replaced by self-regulating orders (e.g. the market).  Plurality, difference, 
and the need for coordination might be replaced by uniformity (e.g. ‘the people’ of 
populism).  Contingency and the availability of alternatives might be replaced by fate and 
necessity (e.g. ‘the will of the market’).  And political power and authority might be replaced 
by a particular notion of individual liberty (e.g. Hobbes’s view of life as solitary and short).  
Schedler’s second form of anti-political thought works, by contrast, to conquest, colonise, 
and invade politics so that its communicative rationality becomes subverted and replaced by 
another form of rationality from another societal subsystem or non-political mode of action 
(e.g. money and the market, or science and technology, or entertainment and advertising, or 
the family and intimacy).  This gives us: instrumental anti-politics – when technocratic 
experts colonise the space of politics; amoral anti-politics – when the space of politics is 
colonised by utility-maximising, rational, private individuals; moral anti-politics – when 
moral absolutists colonise the space of politics; and aesthetic anti-politics – when the space of 
politics is colonised by theatrical performances. 
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In defining politics as communicative interaction between interest groups and oriented 
towards collective decisions, Schedler follows a long tradition of thinking about politics and 
anti-politics – running from Aristotle (see Weiler, 1997) to Crick (1962) to Stoker (2006) – 
that views politics as deriving from certain conditions in which different interest groups 
confront each other across complex moral terrains, and views politics as involving content 
appropriate to such conditions: tolerating, canvassing, listening, discussing, negotiating, 
conciliating, compromising, and so on.  This is a different tradition, though with some 
overlap (see Clarke, 2012), to that followed by scholars currently using the term ‘post-
politics’.  Such scholars include radical philosophers and theorists from Rancière to Mouffe, 
Žižek, Nancy, and Badiou, whose arguments have been developed particularly powerfully by 
Eric Swyngedouw (2009, 2010, 2011).  They emphasise the participatory and antagonistic 
qualities of politics, defining post-politics as activity or situations in which certain 
participants and topics get excluded from discussions in order that consensus might be 
reached between the rest.  This often happens in contemporary forms of governance among 
disciplined stakeholders (i.e. those prepared to start from shared assumptions like neoliberal 
capitalism, parliamentary democracy, humanitarianism, and cosmopolitanism – 
Swyngedouw, 2009).  Examples include governance for sustainability in Brussels 
(Oosterlynk and Swyngedouw, 2010) and Taipei (Raco and Lin, 2012), international 
discussions about climate change (Kythreotis, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2009, 2010), and spatial 
planning in England (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012).  Exclusions of participants or 
topics for discussion mean that little ever changes through such processes of governance and 
consensus.  The existing arrangement of things – ‘the police’ (Rancière, 2004) – proceeds as 
before.  Indeed, this can be the point of such processes.  Raco and Lin (2012) provide the 
example of Taipei, where collaboration around sustainability works to control an emerging 
civil society while at the same time deflecting attention from rising social inequalities and 
environmental degradation.  Yet politics, in the radical tradition of Rancière, Swyngedouw, 
and others, is meant to change things for the better and not just to keep the peace in plural 
societies (Castree et al, 2010) – the latter being a valid endpoint of classical, Aristotelian 
political theory and practice. 
In this paper, by contrast, we use the term ‘anti-politics’ and draw on the tradition to 
which it belongs for three main reasons.  First, their definition of politics includes multiple 
styles of human interaction – antagonism but also toleration, discussion, negotiation, 
conciliation etc. – that seem valid in plural societies where knowledge is partial and moral 
issues are complex.  There is a danger that too much toleration and conciliation of existing 
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privileged groups leads to conservation in already unjust societies.  But this danger is not so 
great as to justify narrowing “proper politics”, “true politics”, or “genuine politics” 
(Swyngedouw, 2009) to only antagonistic styles of human interaction: dissent, critique, 
polemic, interruption, division, disagreement, conflict, uncompromising attempts to 
universalise demands, and so on (ibid).  So, for example, in her discussion of community 
politics in London, Jane Wills highlights its political potential in ways that move beyond such 
interpretations of politics (Wills, 2012).  Second, as heuristic, the literature on anti-politics 
provides a more extensive and useful range of alternatives to politics.  Governance is one of 
these alternatives.  But others include those listed by Schedler and outlined above (abolished 
politics, colonised politics, instrumental anti-politics, amoral anti-politics, aesthetic anti-
politics etc.), or those listed by Crick (1962) including the anti-politics of ideologues, the 
anti-politics of direct democrats, and the anti-politics of technocrats.  Finally, the term ‘anti-
politics’ does not imply, whether intentionally or not, a periodisation of history into a 
properly political past of antagonism and progress, and a post-political present of consensus 
and conservation – even if this post-political present gets punctuated by conflict expressed in 
other ways e.g. revolts, rebellions, and insurgencies in Athens, London, Tunis, Cairo etc. 
(Swyngedouw, 2011); or protest movements in Taipei (Raco and Lin, 2012); or judicial 
reviews of planning decisions in England (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012).  Instead, if 
anything, the term ‘anti-politics’ implies an active strategy more than a passive condition, 
mobilised at specific and various historical conjunctures, that is anti-political in one respect 
(by abolishing or colonising Aristotelian politics), yet determinedly political in another, 
serving to advance the interests of certain groups by means other than crude violence. 
This framework of anti-politics allows us to see New Labour’s localism as anti-
political because although it recognised the preconditions for politics (the plurality of society 
and the need for collective decisions among different interest groups), it replaced the content 
of politics – the discussion and negotiation associated with Local Authority committees, for 
example – with expertise and technology in the form of Local Authority chief executives, 
Government Offices in the Regions, the Audit Commission, central targets etc. (perceived to 
be more efficient and also, by mobilising objective evidence in place of subjective interests, 
more effective).  The localism of the Coalition Government, by contrast, denies even the 
preconditions for politics.  It imagines a nation of autonomous and internally homogeneous 
localities.  Then it replaces the content of politics – canvassing of majority but also minority 
opinions, listening and discussing, conciliating and compromising etc. – with two things: 
markets, through which localities are thought to get the services they deserve – the services a 
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critical mass of local people are prepared to support by user-fees or volunteer-hours (e.g. 
parks or libraries or swimming pools or anything covered by a combination of local 
government funding cuts, limited statutory duties for Local Authorities, the ‘Community 
Right to Buy’ local assets, and the Asset Transfer Fund); and, secondly, technologies of 
direct democracy such as referenda, through which majorities, however slight, might control 
council tax levels or housing development (in the latter case, via the ‘Community Right to 
Build’). 
In the quotations above, Pickles accuses New Labour of Schedler’s second form of 
anti-politics: the colonisation of the space of politics by the instrumental rationality of 
technology and expertise – by “lawyers”, “bureaucrats”, and “quangos”.  Incidentally, he 
might have also mentioned Blair’s moral absolutism and theatrical performances.  But in 
place of New Labour’s instrumental anti-politics, Pickles offers only Schedler’s first form of 
anti-politics: the abolition of the public sphere of politics so that uniform populations and 
self-regulating orders – “the folks” who “know what’s best for them” – are left to run their 
course.  We have seen how this latter form of anti-politics fails to recognise the translocal 
geography of “the folks” and the radical plurality of localities – such that “folks” often differ 
by subject position and fail to agree on “what’s best for them”.  It also overestimates the 
ability of local actors to shape their locality in a world of distanciated relations.  Therefore, 
we can expect the anti-political vision of the Coalition Government fairly quickly to find 
itself confronted by a given political reality of diverse interest groups, complex moral 
terrains, and needs for collective decisions both within and between localities.  We can expect 
this anti-political strategy to have its moment, but not to become an enduring condition. 
 
6. Conclusions: Localism in Theory and Practice 
Localism is a fuzzy, political concept with many uses and meanings.  It describes a positive 
disposition towards the decentralisation of political power – because of the supposed 
connection between decentralisation and democracy, effective government, freedom, and 
community.  Alternatively, it describes the actual decentralisation of political power, either to 
elected local government or to other bodies presumed to be local e.g. partnerships, 
neighbourhood organisations, community groups, civil-society organisations, private-sector 
firms, public-service professionals, or individuals.  Third, localism describes the fight for 
locality by locally dependent people – using any effective space of engagement (from the 
local to the global).  Lastly, it describes the production and use of locality as a space of 
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engagement to a variety of ends, including: regulation of the capitalist economy; efficient 
organisation of welfare provision; and government of the population. 
The uses and meanings of localism have been explored in this paper with a focus on 
localism’s relationship to liberalism and decentralisation, and the geographies and politics of 
localism.  This has been done using a case study of localism in practice: the localism of the 
UK’s Coalition Government.  So we are left with the beginnings of a critical assessment of 
this particular localism (as it relates to comparable localisms).  The Coalition conceives of 
localism as a solution to the problems of advanced liberal governance because it promises the 
breakup of bureaucracy and seems to undermine big politics, moving beyond class politics, 
serving to responsibilise communities, and making it easier to introduce choice through 
market-based delivery.  But Localism is becoming a problem of government for the 
Coalition, as it was for New Labour.  The problem today is less one of general principle (e.g. 
equity of service provision across space) and more one of control over certain particularly 
sensitive policy areas e.g. taxation, economic development, and access to education and 
housing.  In addition, this problem is being addressed not by targets and inspections but by 
economic incentives.  Furthermore, localism here works ideologically to obscure the agency 
and responsibility of localities in a globalised world.  It also looks set to exacerbate recent 
trends towards governance, partnerships, unbundled public services, and fragmented 
localities.  Finally, this localism seeks to replace New Labour’s technocratic government, but 
it appears to be doing so with just another form of anti-politics: naïve, populist liberalism. 
These are only the beginnings of a critical assessment of the localism of the Coalition 
Government.  History teaches that governmental intentions rarely translate straightforwardly 
into governmental effects.  This is because governments tend to lack coherence – say 
between the Treasury and the Department of Communities and Local Government.  
Rationalities, mentalities, and programmes of government also tend to lack coherence – say 
between centralisation and decentralisation, or between representative and participatory 
democracy.  Meanwhile, people tend to resist change and attempts to govern their conduct 
because they have interests vested in the status quo and/or because they are persons capable 
of reasoning and seeing the flaws of proposed developments.  So there is more research to be 
done on how English localism translates in the coming years from policy document and 
legislation to everyday practice and experience. 
Such research might take the conceptual insights from this paper as starting points.  
First, localism can usefully be thought of as spatial liberalism.  In the case of recent and 
current British politics, it is not appropriate to measure localism against some ideal of 
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absolute decentralisation, nor to dismiss it for being rhetorical, ideological cover regarding 
some project of complete centralisation.  Rather, in practice, such localism describes the 
assembly and liberation of rational and responsible localities to act in the interests of general 
security and wellbeing.  This involves decentralisation where possible, government of local 
actors through liberal technologies where appropriate, and government through illiberal 
technologies or centralisation where deemed necessary.  The lens of spatial liberalism, then, 
brings into focus at least two key questions for any localism.  What is its conception of 
rational and responsible local action?  And what are its preferred technologies of government 
for ensuring such action? 
The second insight is that localism is not straightforwardly local in terms of its 
geographies and politics.  Localities are neither coherent nor autonomous.  They are 
heterogeneous, contested, and produced through distanciated relations.  Local actors often 
have complex institutional geographies, embedded as they are in partnerships, associations, 
groups, and contracts stretching down into neighbourhoods and out into other localities, 
regions, and countries.  Such complexity poses challenges for tracing democratic 
accountability and ensuring democratic participation.  To be effective, localism in defence of 
locally dependent groups must operate in multiple spaces of engagement.  To be responsible, 
localism must know and regulate its effects on distant places and people. 
The final insight is that localism may be anti-political in at least two distinct ways.  If 
politics describes activity assuming the simultaneous existence of different interest groups 
within a territorial unit, and activity involving formalised modes of canvassing, listening, 
discussing, negotiating, conciliating, compromising, and collective decision-making, then 
localism can evade or colonise politics, replacing the communicative rationality of politics 
with another rationality e.g. the instrumental rationality of science and technology.  
Alternatively, localism can seek to abolish politics, imaging uniform populations where 
plurality and difference exist, and imaging self-regulating orders in place of collective 
problems.  The latter is anti-political in one respect, in that central assumptions and content 
associated with Aristotelian politics are denied; but political in another respect, since it 
involves strategic action to further particular interests in society. 
 
Notes 
1. Annex A of the Localism Bill (HM Government, 2010b) details those parts of the Bill 
applying to England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.  None apply to Northern 
Ireland.  Hardly any apply to Scotland (a rare example is abolition of the Infrastructure 
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Planning Committee, which previously covered Scottish infrastructure planning).  A few 
apply to Wales (e.g. requirements that Local Authorities publish information on senior 
pay, and provisions for Local Authorities to lower Business Rates and for communities to 
retain more of the Community Infrastructure Levy).  The vast majority of the Localism 
Bill, and the localism agenda more broadly, applies only to England. 
2. These plans translated into referenda in 10 English cities on 3 May 2012. Only one of 
those cities, Bristol, voted for the mayoral system. 
3. Council Tax is a residential property tax collected by Local Authorities in England, 
Scotland, and Wales to part-fund local government services. 
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Figure 1: Major Legislative and Policy Documents Relevant to Localism, May 2010 to 
November 2011 
Date Document Relevant content 
20/05/10 The Coalition: Our 
Programme for 
Government 
Plans: 
 to abolish Regional Spatial Strategies; 
 to give communities the right to bid and take over local state-run 
services; 
 to give residents the power to instigate local referendums on any local 
issue and the power to veto excessive council tax increases; 
 to give greater financial autonomy to local government and community 
groups; 
 to create Local Enterprise Partnerships (business-led bodies to promote 
local economic development); 
 to decentralise the planning system; 
 to freeze council tax for at least one year. 
26/05/10 Academies Bill Plans to expand the proportion of Academies. 
22/06/10 Budget Compensatory funding (£650m) made available for local authorities that 
freeze council tax (equivalent to a rise of approx. 2.5%). 
30/06/10 Public Services 
(Social Enterprise 
and Social Value 
Bill) 
Plans to require public authorities (e.g. local authorities) to have regard to 
economic, social, and environmental wellbeing in connection with public 
services contracts (to encourage contracting out to social enterprises). 
27/07/10 Academies Act More schools allowed to become academies. 
20/10/10 Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
2010-15 
 Revenue funding to local government cut by 26% in real terms 
(excluding schools, fire, and police). 
 Ring-fencing of all revenue grants ended from 2011-12 (except school 
grants and new public health grant from 2013). 
 £4 billion of grants in 2010-11 rolled into formula grant (the grant 
redistributed from the central pot of business rates the Treasury collects 
from local authorities), reducing over 90 core revenue grants (e.g. Race 
Equality, Concessionary Travel, Animal Health Enforcement, AIDS 
support) to fewer than 10 (e.g. New Homes Bonus, Council Tax Freeze 
Grant, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Administration Grant, 
PFI Grant). 
 Capital funding to local government cut by 45% in real terms. 
 £650m made available to local government to encourage freezing of 
Council tax in the coming year. 
 Council tax capping power retained until 2012-13 (when residents 
should be able to veto council tax rises themselves using referenda). 
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 Schools budget increased by 0.1% in real terms each year, including 
£2.5bn for Pupil Premium (to follow pupils from deprived 
backgrounds).  Capital funding for schools cut by 60% in real terms. 
 Additional social care funding of £530m in 2011-12, rising to £1bn in 
2013-14. 
 Social housing budget halved. 
 Roads budget for non-national roads cut by 8%. 
 Annual flood defence and coastal erosion budget cut from £763m to 
£500m. 
 Community Budgets to be introduced in 16 areas from April 2011.  The 
intention is to introduce them in all areas from 2013.  These first 16 
will focus on families with complex needs. 
 New Homes Bonus to be introduced from April 2011 (with central 
government matching the increased council tax from new housing stock 
for six years, and a premium for ‘affordable homes’ of 36%). 
28/10/10 Local Economic 
Growth White Paper 
Plans to replace Regional Development Agencies with Local Enterprise 
Partnerships.  These should reflect local economies in their size and shape 
(e.g. the Leeds City Region or the Thames Valley).  They should be free to 
experiment (i.e. free from central government guidance).  They should be 
led by the private sector (in partnership with other sectors).  They should 
bid into the £1.4bn Regional Growth Fund. 
24/11/10 Education White 
Paper 
Plans to expand the proportion of Academies and Free Schools (funded by 
central government; freed from local government control; able to vary the 
school day, the curriculum, and pay and conditions for staff). 
01/12/10 Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility 
Bill 
Plans to abolish police authorities and for police commissioners to be 
directly elected. 
01/12/10 Public Health White 
Paper 
Plans to give local government the majority of £4bn to address public health 
issues like smoking, obesity, and excessive drinking (through transport, 
housing, education, and other policies and services). 
07/12/10 Modernising 
Commissioning 
Green Paper 
Plans to open up public services to civil society organisations and SMEs 
using: 
 Proportions (a certain proportion of public services should be provided 
independently); 
 A Right to Challenge (for civil society organisations to challenge local 
authority delivery); 
 A Right to Buy (for civil society to buy community assets); 
 A Right to Provide (for public sector workers to form mutuals and take 
over service delivery); 
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 A Civil Society Red Tape Taskforce (targeting barriers to participation 
in public service markets such as short tender deadlines or long and 
complex contracts); 
 A Big Society Bank (helping civil society organisations to access 
resources); 
 Community Budgets (where commissioning is done by local public 
service partnerships); 
 Personal Budgets (where commissioning is done by individuals); 
 A Right to Control (where commissioning is done by individuals in 
receipt of direct payments). 
13/12/10 Localism Bill Plans: 
 ‘To lift the burden of bureaucracy’ by abolishing Regional Strategies 
and the Standards Board regime; 
 ‘To empower communities’ by introducing a General Power of 
Competence for local authorities, a Community Right to Buy local 
assets threatened with closure, and Neighbourhood Plans; 
 ‘To increase local control of public finance’ by introducing Council 
Tax referenda, allowing local authorities to discount business rates, and 
requiring local authorities to allocate a proportion of Community 
Infrastructure Levy income back to the neighbourhood level; 
 ‘To diversify the supply of public services’ by introducing a 
Community Right to Challenge the running of services, and a 
Community Right to Buy local assets; 
 ‘To open up government to public scrutiny’ by requiring local 
authorities to make annual statements about salaries for senior staff and 
to publish information on items of expenditure over £500; 
 ‘To strengthen accountability to local people’ by introducing local 
referenda on any issue for which a petition can be generated, and 
elected mayors for England’s 12 largest cities outside London. 
13/12/10 Local Government 
Finance Settlement 
2011-12 
 Total formula grant cut by 12.1%. 
 Total funding for local government (including e.g. schools grant) cut by 
2.7%. 
 Spending power (formula grant + NHS support + council tax receipts) 
cut by an average of 4.4%.  The worst hit councils get cuts of 8.9%. 
 £650m provided as compensation if councils freeze council tax. 
 Number of specific grants cut from c100 to 12.  With a couple of 
exceptions (schools and public health), none of these are ring-fenced. 
 Local authorities encouraged to manage cuts by sharing services, 
cutting out waste, improving procurement, bringing senior pay under 
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control, and tapping reserves. 
19/01/11 Health and Social 
Care Bill 
Plans to give local government responsibility for health improvement, and 
for this responsibility to be discharged via Health and Wellbeing Boards 
(bringing together local authorities, GP consortia, and other relevant 
bodies). 
23/03/11 Budget 11 Local Enterprise Zones established (embedded within Local Enterprise 
Partnerships; incorporating tax breaks for businesses, simplified planning 
rules, and super-fast broadband; benefiting from retained business rates for 
25 years). 
11/07/11 Open Public Services 
White Paper 
Plans to make public services more responsive and efficient by introducing 
more: 
 Choice (using Direct Payments, Personal Budgets, and Entitlements); 
 Decentralisation (to local authorities, neighbourhood councils, 
community groups etc.); 
 Providers (public, private, and voluntary sector); 
 Access (using the Pupil Premium and New Homes Bonus); 
 Accountability (using elected Police and Crime Commissioners, elected 
mayors, local referenda, and publication of contract and spending data). 
 
Plans for three types of public service: 
 Individual services (e.g. education, adult social care, childcare, housing 
support – controlled by individuals using Direct Cash Payments, 
Personal Budgets, Vouchers, Entitlements, and performance data);  
 Neighbourhood services (e.g. maintenance of the local public realm, 
leisure and recreation facilities, community safety – controlled by 
elected councils at the local or neighbourhood level using the 
Community Right to Buy, the Community Right to Challenge, 
Neighbourhood Planning, and Community Budgets); 
 Commissioned services (e.g. tax collection, prisons, welfare to work – 
controlled by government at the national or local level using 
commissioning, Payment by Results, and the General Power of 
Competence for local government). 
15/11/11 Education Act  Some duties removed from schools. 
 Academies programme extended to provision for 16-19 year olds and 
alternative provision for the most vulnerable children. 
15/11/11 Localism Act See Localism Bill above (no major amendments). 
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Figure 2: Other Legislative and Policy Announcements Relevant to Localism, May 2010 to 
November 2011 
Date Document Relevant content 
09/06/10 DCLG press release Minimum housing density targets removed from Planning Policy 
Statement 3. 
25/06/10 DCLG press release Comprehensive Area Assessments abolished. 
22/07/10 Written Statement by Eric 
Pickles, Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local 
Government, to Parliament 
Plans to abolish Government Offices in the Regions. 
13/08/10 DCLG press release Plans to abolish the Audit Commission. 
31/08/10 DCLG press release Plans to allow local authorities to abolish outdated bylaws and to 
introduce new ones (without consulting Whitehall). 
20/09/10 DCLG press release Plans to allow local authorities to decide on their own system of 
governance (Mayor, Leader and Cabinet, or Committee). 
21/09/10 DCLG press release Plans for a Barrier Busting Team to help community groups to 
establish local projects. 
22/09/10 DCLG press release Plans to introduce a Community Right to Build (where housing 
developments receiving support of more than 75% in local 
referenda will automatically receive planning permission). 
24/09/10 DCLG press release Plans to postpone council tax revaluation in England until after the 
next general election. 
12/10/10 Speech by Grant Shapps, 
Minister for Housing and Local 
Government, to the Housing 
Market Intelligence 
Conference 
Plans to replace central house-building targets with a New Homes 
Bonus (rewarding communities who approve house building in 
their localities with extra funding). 
12/10/10 Speech by Grant Shapps to the 
Housing Market Intelligence 
Conference 
Plans to reduce Building Regulations. 
13/10/10 Written Statement by Eric 
Pickles to Parliament 
Local authorities and their partners given permission to amend or 
drop any of their 4700 Local Area Agreement targets.  Where they 
choose to keep targets, central government will no longer monitor 
performance against them.  No further LAAs will need preparing 
from April 2011 (when existing agreements expire). 
13/10/10 Written Statement by Eric 
Pickles to Parliament 
Plans to replace the National Indicator Set (c200 indicators) with a 
smaller list of data required from local government by central 
government. 
19/01/11 Speech by Eric Pickles to The Plans to reform business rates, allowing local authorities to 
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Economist’s Liveable Cities 
Conference 
borrow against future business rates (Tax Increment Financing), 
and, eventually, to keep more of their business rates. 
09/02/11 Written Statement by Eric 
Pickles to Parliament 
Plans to cap Council Tax for 2011-12 in all cases of ‘excessive 
increase’. 
11/02/11 DCLG press release New Publicity Code for local government (to control the 
circulation and content of local government newspapers). 
16/02/11 DCLG press release Local authorities encouraged to give councillors a vote on senior 
officer salaries over £100,000. 
01/03/11 Speech by Eric Pickles to the 
National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations Annual 
Conference 
Local authorities encouraged (under threat of statutory force) to 
cut funding and contracts to voluntary and community groups 
only in proportion to other local government cuts, to consult with 
such groups prior to making cuts, and to provide such groups with 
three months’ notice of cuts. 
01/03/11 DCLG press release Asset Transfer Unit established with £1m for 2011-12.  Plan is to 
help communities and voluntary sector groups to take over 
buildings and services from local government (e.g. libraries or 
parks) and to generate income with them and to become 
financially sustainable. 
08/03/11 DCLG press release Plans to reduce the number of statutory duties of local authorities. 
23/03/11 Written Statement by Eric 
Pickles to Parliament 
Local Authority Two-Tier Code revoked (meaning that private 
firms which take on council services no longer need to respect the 
terms of council workers transferred across nor to employ new 
workers on the same terms as those transferred across). 
10/05/11 Speech by Grant Shapps to the 
Home Builders Federation 
Annual Lunch 
Plans to reduce the number of pages of Planning Law and 
Guidance (from c1000 to 52). 
25/08/11 DCLG press release Small business rate relief doubled, October 2011 to September 
2012. 
29/09/11 DCLG press release Code of Recommended Practice for Local Authorities on Data 
Transparency published.  Councils encouraged to publish details 
of contracts, tenders, performance, salaries, and assets. 
30/09/11 DCLG press release Weekly Collections Support Scheme launched.  £250m available 
to councils restoring weekly collections of household waste. 
03/10/11 Speech by George Osborne, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
to the Conservative Party 
Conference 
£800m available to councils freezing council tax in 2012-13 
(equivalent to a rise of approx. 2.5%). 
07/10/11 DCLG press release Plans to reform local government pensions.  Employee 
contributions will rise.  Accrual rates will change.  Retirement will 
be later in life. 
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31/10/11 DCLG press release Plans to allow councils to remove council tax relief on second 
homes and empty homes (so long as they use the proceeds to 
lower council tax in general). 
07/11/11 Written Statement by Eric 
Pickles to Parliament 
Growing Places Fund launched.  £500m available to Local 
Enterprise Partnerships for infrastructure projects to boost local 
economic growth. 
 
 
